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RECENT CASES
ADOPTION-STATUS OF ADOPTED PERSON-ADoPTED CHILD NOT ALLOWED TO
INHERIT THROUGH ADOPTING PARENT AS ISSUE. A died in Massachusetts
possessed of property wholly within that state. She left a legacy to B, her
nephew, who had predeceased her. B, while a resident of California, had
adopted the respondents, his only heirs. The question presented was whether
the respondents were entitled to take the legacy through B. The court held
that under the applicable Massachusetts law, an adopted child does not
become for all purposes the issue of the adopting parents and that the
respondents were not entitled to take the legacy. Arnold v. Helmer, 100
N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1951).
A Massachusetts statute provides that a child adopted in another state is
entitled to all the rights given to such a child in the state of his adoption
"'except so far as such rights are in conflict with this chapter." I However
another provision of the above quoted chapter provides that an adopted child
may inherit from his adoptive parents, but from no other kindred of his
adopting parents,2 thus excluding the respondents in the instant case. In
addition, the Massachusetts statute on wills proi'ides that, where a legacy is
left to one who dies before the testator, the issue of such predeceased legatee
shall take the same estate he would have taken had he survived. 3 The word
"issue" as used in the latter statute apparently does not include adopted
children.
Adoption is a development from early Rome, being unknown to the Common
Law. Since it is purely statutory in this country, the rights acquired by the
adopted child vary from state to state. Where the laws of two states are in
conflict as to the adopted child's right of inheritance, one of two general
principles is usually applied.
4
The first such general principle is that the rights of inheritance are fixed
by the state effecting the adoption and cannot later be altered. This rule
might well be subdivided into two parts: (a) that the rights granted by the
state of adoption cannot be enlarged by the courts of another state, and (b)
that the rights given the child by the state of adoption cannot be changed in
1. Mass. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 210 §9 (1932).
2. Mass. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 210, §7 (1932) provides: "A person adopted in accordance
with this chapter shall take the same share of the property which the adopting parent could
dispose of by will as he would have taken if born to such parent in lawful wedlock,
and he shall stand in regard to the legal descendants, but to no other of the kindred of
such adopting parent, in the same position as if so born to him ...-
3. Mass. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 191, §22 (1932) provides: "If a devise or legacy is made
to a child or other relation of the testator, who dies before the testator, but leaves issue
surviving the testator, such issue shall, unless a different disposition is made or required
by the will, take the same estate which the person whose issue they are would have taken
if he had survived the testator."
4. A third rule formerly applied in a few jurisdictions was that the adopted child had
no right of inheritance outside the state of his adoption. This doctrine was laid down in
Brown v. Finley, 157 Ala. 424, 47 So. 577 (1908) (Georgia adoption conferred no right
of inheritance in Alabama); and followed in Frey v. Nielson, 99 N.J.Eq. 135, 132 Ati.
765 (1926) (child adopted in New York denied right of inheritance in New Jersey);
but the latter state overruled the doctrine in Greaves v. Fogel, 12 N.J.Super. 5, 78 A.2d
719 (1951) (child adopted in Pennsylvania inherited New Jersey land). Supported solely
by the Alabama decision cited, this rule is of practically no importance today.
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any way. Early decisions in Kansas 5 and New Hampshire 6 held that where
the adopted child's right of inheritance was limited by the state effecting
the adoption it could not later be enlarged. by another state. However, both
states later reversed these deisions.7 Iowa 8 and' Arkansas 9 decisions still
support this proposition. Sub-rule (b) is supported by a Connecticut
decision.' 0
The second general principle, and. the one followed .by the vast majority
of American courts, is that the state creating the adoption establishes both
the child's status as an adopted child and %its right of inheritance, but the
right of inheritance is limited by interpretation to accord with the .rights
of a child adopted in the state of the inheritance." The leading authority
for this rule is Ross v. Ross 12 which asserted that the "status or condition of
a person . . .. is fixed by the law of the domicile; and that this status and
capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other state, so far as they
are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy." 13 The case has long
13. Id at 246.
been considered authority for upholding the law of the deceased's domicile
over that of the state of the adoption where the laws of the two are in conflict.
A careful reading of the Ross case however, discloses that the laws of Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts were not in conflict on any material point brought
before the court. The same decision would have been reached by applying
the laws of either jurisdiction. The quoted proposition is therefore obiter
dictum, yet it has become the majority rule in this country. 14 In following
the long established precedent of the Ross case, the court in the instant case
denied the legacy to heirs who would have experienced no legal difficulty in
obtaining it had their adoptive parent out-lived the testatrix by as much
as one day.
5. In Boaz v. Swinney, 79 Kan. 539, 99 Pac. 621 (1909), a child adopted in Illinois,
where an adopted child could inherit from, but not through, adoptive parents, was denied
inheritance through an adoptive parent although Kansas law allowed such inheritance
through adoptive parents.
6. Meader v. Archer, 65 N.H. 214, 23 Atl. 521 (1889).
7. In re Rieman's Estate, 124 Kan. 539, 262 Pac. 16 (1927); Anderson v. French,
77 N.H. 509, 93 At. 1042 (1915).
8. In re Sunderland, 60 Iowa 732, 13 N.W. 655 (1882) (child adopted in Louisiana
allowed to inherit from, but not through, adoptive parents by following Louisiana rather
than Iowa law).
9. Shaver v. Nash, 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S.W.2d 298 (1930).
10. Slattery v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Company, 115 Conn. 163, 161 AtI. 79
(1932), a child adopted in Michigan, which allowed an adopted child to inherit from
both its natural and adoptive parents, was allowed to inherit from its natural father in
Connecticut, though such right would not have been accorded one adopted in Connecticut.
11. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §143 (1934): "The status of adoption, created by
the law of a state having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another
state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own
law." Cf. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §305, Comment b, (1934): "If the law of the
state of the decedent's domicil allows an adopted child to take a distributive share, a
legally adopted child will take a share although the law of the state of adoption or of
the state where a chattel is provides otherwise. If the law of the state of the decedent'(
domicil does not allow an adopted child to take a distributive share, he cannot do so,
although the law of the state of adoption or of the state where a chattel is would allow
him to take." See Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co., 46 A.2d 881 (Del. 1946).
12. 129 Mass. 243 (1880).
14. The multitude of cases which quote or reiterate the doctrine of the Ross case
include: Keegan v. Geraghty, 101 Ill.26 (1881); In re Rieman's Estate, 124 Kan. 539,
262 Pac. 16 (1927); Anderson v. French, 77 N.H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042 (1915) (where the
court recognized the proposition laid down by the Ross case as mere dictum); In. re
Finkerzeller's Estate, 105 N.J.Eq. 44, 146 Ad. 656 (1929); In re Zoell's Estate, 345
Pa. 413, 29 A.2d 31 (1942).
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A more liberal view has been taken by at least one Canadian court which
held that a child adopted in Massachusetts could take a legacy which
descended through its adoptive parent because Massachusetts law gave the
child all rights of a child born in lawful wedlock. 15 This unusual result was
reached despite the fact that the common law, at that time, did not even
recognize adoption, and the child, as the instant case indicates, could not
have taken the legacy in the state of his adoption. The Canadian court stated
that the decision in no way conflicted with its own law since the court was
merely giving recognition, by reason of comity, to status acquired in another
jurisdiction.16 It would seem that such a court would have little difficulty
in holding the children in the present case to have become "issue" by
California law and as such entitled to take the legacy.1-
Most courts hold that a testator who devises to "children" is presumed to
include his own adopted children, but not the adopted children of others.1s
This presumption is founded upon the supposition that the law favors blood
lines and each person is presumed to intend to keep his estate within such
lines unless he specifically provides otherwise. The courts apparently feel
that a testator should not be presumed to know or keep an account of
children adopted by his heirs, and on this reasoning courts strictly construe
the adopted child's rights of inheritance.19
Under the present system, the adopted child's rights are uncertain and
variable when he seeks to enforce them outside the jurisdiction of his adoption.
In fairness to the adopted child, his status and rights when acquired in one
jurisdiction should be given full recognition in all others. Since many
statutes 20 provide that an adopted child shall be for all legal consequences
the same as a natural child, a more liberal view of such child's rights seems
essential to execute the obvious legislative intent.
ROBERT H. LUNDBERG
15. Purcell v. Hendricks, 35 B.C.R. 547, 3 D.L.R. 854 (1925).
16. The court intimated, however, that the result might have been different had the
property consisted of realty instead of personalty, since the so-called Statute of Merton
did not apply to personalty.
17. Cf. In re Esposito's Estate, 57 Cal.App.2d 859, 135 P.2d 167 (1943) (illegitimate
children whose father had acknowledged them and taken them into his home allowed to
inherit through him); In re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888) (adopted
child held "issue" of adoptive parent).
18. See, e.g., Caspar v. Helvie, 83 Ind.App. 166, 146 N.E. 123 (1925) (the word
"children" did not include a legatee's adopted children where legacy was over to legatee's
children in case legatee predeceased testator); Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 AtI.
520 (1903) (adopted child held "child" and thus beneficiary of insured).
19. See Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898) (legacy lapsed
because legatee's adopted child was not his "issue").
20. E.g., N.D. Rev. Code §14-1113 (1943) "The child so adopted shall be deemed,
as respects all legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parent and
child, the child of such parent or parents by adoption the same as if he had been born to
them in lawful wedlock." A recent North Dakota case, Hoellinger v. Molzhon, 41
N.W.2d 217 (N.D., 1950) held that adopted children come within the term "lineal
decendants as used in N. D. Rev. Code §56-0420 (1943). Thus a legacy to 'he
predeceased adoptive parent does not lapse, in North Dakota, but descends to the
adopted child.
